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FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE FOOD CHAIN LOOKING UP: 
SUBCONTRACTORS ARE FINDING THAT ADDITIONAL INSURED 
ENDORSEMENTS ARE GIVING THEM MUCH MORE THAN THEY 
BARGAINED FOR 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Exploding dynamite, collapsing scaffolds, falling debris . . . construction 
projects have always been fraught with the possibility of significant risks.  
Surely no one has thought, however, to add additional insured endorsements to 
the list of potential risks.  Yet, given the courts’ recent interpretation of these 
endorsements, adding any entity as an additional insured on your insurance 
policy carries with it a huge risk. 
The term “additional insured” refers to an entity that has been added to 
another entity’s insurance policy.1  This former entity then has the benefit of 
direct rights on the insurance policy and enjoys the same coverage as the 
purchaser of the policy (the named insured), while enjoying no responsibility 
to pay any premiums or deductibles.  This arrangement has recently become 
quite typical in construction contracts, with the general contractor requiring his 
subcontractor to include him as an additional insured on the subcontractor’s 
insurance policy. This is done for a variety of reasons, but overall, general 
contractors have found it to be an extremely effective method to shift risk away 
from themselves in both construction defect and injury claims.  From the 
general contractor’s standpoint, this is a wonderful arrangement. However, it 
seems that very few have thought to look at this from the subcontractor’s point 
of view.2  The modern trend has been to read these endorsements extremely 
broadly; thus, only the slightest suggestion that a subcontractor has some fault 
can force that subcontractor’s insurance to pick up the defense of multiple 
parties.  On its face, this does not sound so horrible: is this not what insurance 
 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 811 (7th ed. 1999). 
 2. Many articles focus on the wonderful benefits general contractors can derive from this 
relationship and fail to mention the detrimental effects this has on the subcontractors whose 
insurance is called on to defend.  See, e.g., Dennis M. Cusack, A Broad View: The Additional 
Insured Endorsement’s Scope, LA DAILY J., Sept. 12, 1996, at 7; Dennis Rolstad & Jordan 
Stanzler, Critical Coverage, Insurance Law: Additional Insured Endorsements are a Valuable 
Source of Protection for Contractors and Project Owners, LA DAILY J., Jan. 12, 2001, at S2; 
Scott S. Thomas, The Endorsers: Aggressively Pursuing Rights Under an Additional Insured 
Endorsement Can Provide Broad Construction Defect Insurance Coverage in the Event of a 
Claim, LA DAILY J., Aug. 13, 1999, at S8. 
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is for?  That is what the courts seem to be saying in their opinions.  The 
problem is that courts do not even consider the impact on the named insured 
(the subcontractor) when his policy is called on to defend.  Every time his 
insurance becomes involved to defend or pay a judgment, the subcontractor 
must pay his deductible and further faces the possibility of escalating 
premiums and diluting policy limits to pay his own costs and judgments. 
This note will first give an overview of additional insured endorsements 
and describe the courts’ evolution in interpreting them.  It will then provide 
reasoning and analysis for why the courts’ current broad interpretation of these 
endorsements is flawed.  Lastly, it will propose a solution.  First, though, 
consider the following hypothetical. 
II.  A HYPOTHETICAL: TROUBLE IN PARADISE 
Imagine the year is 1995, and you are a small specialty subcontractor who 
has just submitted a $20,000 bid to waterproof the decks at the Paradise Condo 
job.  It is a large, new construction project, involving an architect, developer, 
general contractor (GC), and numerous subcontractors (subs).  The GC 
ultimately chooses you to perform the waterproofing instead of the several 
other subs bidding on the job, but only if you agree to sign his subcontract.  
The subcontract requires you to, among other things, name the owner, 
architect, developer, and GC as additional insureds on your liability policy.  
Needing the business you comply, and within a year Paradise Condo is 
completed, and the new unit owners move in.  Everyone is happy. 
It is now 2004, nine years later, and you have just been slapped with a 
lawsuit.  The unit owners of Paradise Condo have filed suit against the GC, 
developer, and architect for various construction defects related to the 
structural components, decks, and balconies of the condos.  Although the 
complaint itself does not allege any specific deficiencies in your work, you are 
brought into the lawsuit both through a third party claim by the GC and 
because the developer and GC have decided to tender their defenses to your 
insurance carrier.  Even though there were numerous other subs working on the 
same project who had also named the developer and GC as additional insureds, 
they have chosen to tender their defenses to your insurer because, after all 
these years, you are one of the few subs still in business and able to be located 
and also because you have one of the best insurance policies.  After discovery 
you find your fault to be about five percent of the total of the two million 
dollars demanded.  Common sense says to settle with the owners for $100,000 
and get out.  The problem is that you are never fully released, as your insurer is 
still paying all the developer’s and GC’s defense costs.  Meanwhile, their 
attorneys are racking up charge after charge, knowing full well that it is some 
other insurer, and not their own clients, who is paying the bills.  It is not long 
before your $250,000 deductible is maxed out, leaving less available for your 
own costs and judgments. 
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What allowed this mess to happen?  How could it have been prevented?  
These issues are discussed in this note. 
III.  ADDITIONAL INSURED V. INDEMNITY PROVISIONS 
Additional insured, not indemnity, provisions are the focus of this note.  
However, before additional insured status can be fully understood it is helpful 
to understand the similarities and differences between additional insured 
provisions and indemnity provisions.  Indemnity provisions are similar to 
additional insured endorsements and impact them in many ways.3  An 
indemnity, frequently referred to as a “hold harmless” agreement, creates an 
obligation on the indemnitor to pay the cost of any loss or damage that an 
indemnitee has incurred while acting at the indemnitor’s request.4  Essentially, 
the indemnity agreement establishes which party will bear losses suffered 
during the performance of the contract.5 
Indemnity agreements are the most widely used and dependable non-
insurance method for transferring the financial consequences of risk to another 
party.6  Liabilities covered by indemnity agreements include defense costs, 
judgments, settlements, and any other costs related to the resolution of the 
injured party’s claim.7  For example, subcontractors typically agree to 
indemnify and hold harmless general contractors for liability arising out of 
their construction operations.8  This means that the subcontractor must pay the 
general contractor’s defense, judgments, and/or settlement costs should the 
contractor be held vicariously liable for injuries or damages caused by the 
subcontractor.9  This indemnity provision is completely separate from the 
subcontractor’s insurance.10  It is a personal agreement by which the 
subcontractor agrees to reimburse the general contractor.  The general 
contractor is not covered by the subcontractor’s insurance and has no rights 
 
 3. See generally DONALD S. MALECKI ET AL., THE ADDITIONAL INSURED BOOK 58 (4th 
ed. 2000). 
 4. Thomas M. Kurke, Contract Law — Has Pennsylvania Adopted an Express Negligence 
Rule for Interpreting Broad, All-Inclusive Indemnity Agreements? — Ruzzi v. Butler Petroleum 
Co., 588 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1991), 65 TEMP. L. REV. 679, 679 (1992).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“indemnity” as “[t]o make good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 772 (7th ed. 1999). 
 5. Lisa Brener Cusimano, Contractual Indemnity Under Maritime and Louisiana Law, 43 
LA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1982). 
 6. PATRICK J. WIELINSKI ET AL., CONTRACTUAL RISK TRANSFER: STRATEGIES FOR 
CONTRACT INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE PROVISIONS § XI.B.1 (2003). 
 7. Samir B. Mehta, Additional Insured Status in Construction Contracts and Moral 
Hazard, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 169, 178 (1996). 
 8. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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under the policy,11 although the subcontractor, when paying the general 
contractor, will nearly always rely on his insurance to fund the obligation.12 
There are three types of indemnities: the limited form indemnity, the 
intermediate form indemnity, and the broad form indemnity.13  The limited 
form indemnity requires the indemnitor (the subcontractor) to save and hold 
harmless the indemnitee (the general contractor) only for the indemnitor’s own 
negligence.14  The intermediate form indemnity requires the indemnitor to save 
and hold harmless the indemnitee for all liability excluding that which arises 
out of the indemnitee’s sole negligence.15  The broad form indemnity obligates 
the indemnitor to save and hold harmless the indemnitee from all liabilities 
arising from the project, regardless of which party’s negligence caused the 
liability.16 
Courts will generally uphold the limited and intermediate forms of 
indemnity so long as they meet the requirements for a valid contract.17  The 
broad form indemnity, however, has been held unenforceable in construction 
contracts by many courts and state statutes on the ground that it violates public 
policy.18  The Supreme Court confirmed this in United States v. M.O. 
Seckinger stating that “[a] contractual provision should not be construed to 
 
 11. Id. at 2. 
 12. Mehta, supra note 7, at 174 n.29; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Subcontractors 
Association at 9, Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648 (Del. 2002) (No. 38-
2001).  Ideally, these indemnity agreements should blend together with the additional insured 
obligation.  However, in practice, the language of the indemnity agreement is rarely used in the 
additional insured endorsement. Lisa Oonk, The Construction Industry: Coverage Issue Created 
by Claims Against Additional Insureds, 28 THE BRIEF 8, 10 (1999).  This leads to much litigation 
regarding the scope of coverage for the additional insured.  In the ensuing cases to interpret the 
scope of the additional insured’s coverage, most courts will not look to the language of the 
indemnity agreement and will look only to the language in the insurance contract. Id.  But see 
Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass’n, 620 P.2d 1102 (Idaho 1980). 
 13. Terry J. Galganski, Owners and Contractors Protective Liability: An Insurance Tool in 
Construction, 15 CONSTR. L. 8, 12 (1995) [hereinafter Galganski, Owners and Contractors]; 
Mehta, supra note 7, at 179. 
 14. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 12; Mehta, supra note 7, at 179. 
 15. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 12-13; Mehta, supra note 7, at 
179. 
 16. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 13; Mehta, supra note 7, at 179. 
 17. Mehta, supra note 7, at 179. 
 18. Id.  The Utah Supreme Court articulated the major public policy argument against broad 
form indemnities in Jankele v. Texas Co., 54 P.2d 425 (Utah 1936), one of the earliest and most 
often cited cases establishing courts’ unfavorable view of broad form indemnities: 
Undoubtedly contracts exempting persons from liability for negligence induce a want of 
care, for the highest incentive to the exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that a 
failure in this respect will fix liability to make full compensation for any injury resulting 
from the cause. It has therefore been declared to be good doctrine that no person may 
contract against his own negligence. 
Id. at 427. 
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permit an indemnitee to recover for his own negligence . . . .”19  Justice 
Brennan noted that the courts have had a “traditional reluctance” to “cast the 
burden of negligent actions upon those that were not actually at fault . . . 
particularly [where] there is a vast disparity in bargaining power . . . between 
the parties.”20 
As of 2003, thirty-four states have passed laws invalidating broad form 
indemnity provisions in construction contracts as unenforceable as against 
public policy.21  Courts in states that have not passed such laws show their 
opposition to these agreements by applying the “clear and unequivocal” test.22  
This test states that in order for a broad form indemnity to be enforceable, there 
must be clear and unequivocal terms in the contract articulating the parties’ 
intent to require such a broad obligation.23  Statutes and strict tests invalidating 
broad form indemnities are the result of strong public policy arguments against 
allowing an indemnitor to save and hold harmless an indemnitee for the 
indemnitee’s own negligence in construction contracts.24  An indemnitee, 
protected from consequences of his negligence, has little incentive to take 
measures to avoid causing injuries.25  By preventing owners and contractors 
from contracting away their duties to the public and to workers, these 
 
 19. United States v. M.O. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 211 (1970). 
 20. Id. at 211-12.  The cases that the Court chose to cite in support of this proposition 
illustrate the long history that it has enjoyed: Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90 
(1955); Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 33 P.2d 974, 977 (Colo. 1934); Sternaman v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763, 766 (N.Y. 1902); Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 
11 S.E. 829, 829-30 (Va. 1890). 
 21. American Subcontractors Association, Inc., Subcontractor’s Chart of Anti-Indemnity 
Statutes, at http://www.asaonline.com/pdf/AntiIndemnityChart.pdf (last updated May 2, 2003).  
Many of these statutes were enacted in the 1970s in response to inequitable and rarely negotiated 
form agreements that forced contractors to indemnify owners and architects from their own 
negligence.  Brief of Amicus Curiae American Subcontractors Association at 27, Barton-Marlow 
Co. v. Grunau Co., 835 So.2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 2D-01-3347). 
 22. Mehta, supra note 7, at 180.  For cases applying this test see, e.g., Craig Constr. Co. v. 
Hendrix, 568 So.2d 752, 756 (Ala. 1990); Washington Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6. v. Baglino Corp., 
817 P.2d 3, 6 (Ariz. 1991) (en banc); Arkansas Kraft Corp. v. Boyed Sanders Constr. Co., 764 
S.W.2d 452, 453 (Ark. 1989); Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 396 P.2d 377, 379 (Cal. 
1964) (en banc); State v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., 297 A.2d 41, 44 (Del. 1972); Rodrigue v. 
LeGros, 563 So. 2d 248, 254 (La. 1990); Parliament Constr. Co. v. Beer Precast Concrete Ltd., 
319 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Mich. 1982); Braegelmann v. Horizon Dev. Co., 371 N.W.2d 644, 646 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 536 S.W.2d 881, 
885 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey v. Honeywell Protective Serv., 
535 A.2d 974, 978 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Perry v. Payne, 66 A. 553, 555-56 (Pa. 
1907); Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990). 
 23. Mehta, supra note 7, at 180-81. 
 24. Id. at 181. 
 25. Id. at 182; Brian Cubbage, Indemnity & Insurance Requirements from the Sub’s Point of 
View, CFMA: BUILDING PROFITS, May/June 2003 at 3, available at http://www.cfma.org/ 
documents/Cubbage%20M_J%2003.pdf. 
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prohibitions on broad form indemnities serve to protect construction workers 
and the general public from suffering construction related injures by 
encouraging accident prevention methods.26 
IV.  ADDITIONAL INSURED STATUS AND HOW IT HAPPENS 
When a construction contract is awarded, all general contractors and 
subcontractors working on the project will nearly always be required to carry a 
certain amount of liability insurance that will pay defense, settlement, and 
judgment costs should a claim arise for an injury or a construction defect.  
“Named insureds” are the persons or businesses to whom the liability policy is 
issued.27  The named insured pays the premium and deductibles, has the power 
to cancel the policy, and is entitled to receive notice of cancellation from the 
insurer.28 
Because the possibility of death or injury readily exists with each 
construction project, it is very likely that someone’s insurance will be called 
upon at some point to defend or pay a judgment.  Realizing this risk, it is very 
common today for a property owner contractually to require his designer, 
program manager, construction manager, and general contractor to name him 
as an additional insured on their insurance policies.29  In turn, these stronger 
parties push this insurance liability to the participant on the bottom: the 
subcontractor.30  The additional insured (the general contractor) is thus given a 
direct contractual relationship with the named insured’s (the subcontractor’s) 
insurance carrier, but with no responsibilities to pay the policy premium.31  
The additional insured receives the benefit of coverage under the named 
insured’s policy, while it is the named insured that actually pays any additional 
premium.32 
 
 26. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co. v. Mid-west Conveyor Co., 750 A.2d 518, 521 (Del. 2000); 
Bosio v. Branigar Org., 506 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Guitard v. Gulf Oil Co., 670 
P.2d 969, 972-73 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). 
 27. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 11. 
 28. Id. at 14; WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.C.5. 
 29. Terry J. Galganski, The Insurance Exceptions of the Missouri Anti-Indemnity Statute 
(Part I), 58 J. MO. B. 86, 88 (2002) [hereinafter Galganski, Insurance Exceptions]. 
 30. Id.; Cubbage, supra note 25, at 2; Walsh Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw, 76 P.3d 164, 
169 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Audio Tape, House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Commerce, SB 788, Tape 33, Slide A, (May 11, 1995) [statement of Representative Larry 
Wells]). 
 31. Galganski, Insurance Exceptions, supra note 29, at 88. 
 32. Douglas R. Richmond, The Additional Problems of Additional Insureds, 33 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 945, 948 (1998) [hereinafter Richmond, Additional Problems].  The additional insured, 
however, does not have the same rights as the named insured.  For example, the additional 
insured has no right to be notified that the named insured’s policy has been cancelled. Mehta, 
supra note 7, at 173. 
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Additional insured status does not happen automatically.  The general 
contractor only becomes an additional insured after the subcontractor has 
added an endorsement (an amendment) to his policy.33  These endorsements 
typically come in one of two categories: either the “standard” form, developed 
by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for general use, or the “manuscript” 
form, drafted by the insurance company for a specific situation.34  The most 
common ISO “standard forms” are the ISO Endorsement Form CG 20 09 and 
the ISO Endorsement Form CG 20 10.35 
V.  WHY GENERAL CONTRACTORS INSIST ON ADDITIONAL INSURED STATUS 
Historically, additional insured endorsements have been considered to be 
one of several valid techniques for the allocation of risks.36  The possibility of 
bodily injury, property damage, and death readily exists with each construction 
project.37  The construction industry accounted for 19.5% of workplace 
fatalities in 2000 and 20.8% in 2001, even though the industry employed less 
than 5.2% of the workforce in either year.38  In addition, the workers’ 
compensation laws of most states allow injured workers to sue the general 
contractor for additional money, even if they have already collected from their 
employer’s (the subcontractor’s) workers’ compensation insurer.39  Possible 
construction defect lawsuits elevate the risks even higher.40  By hiring a 
subcontractor, a general contractor exposes himself to these liability risks, 
 
 33. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 57; Galganski, Insurance Exceptions, supra note 29, at 
88. 
 34. David R. Hendrick, Insurance Law: Understanding the Basics Regarding “Additional 
Insureds,” 690 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 591, 617 (2003). 
 35. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 14.  The ISO CG 20 09 
endorsement, also called the long form, adds additional insureds “but only with respect to liability 
arising out of [the named insured’s work] for the additional insured or acts or omissions of the 
additional insured in connection with their general supervision of [the named insured’s] work.”  
Oonk, supra note 12, at 11.  The ISO CG 20 10 endorsement, also called the short form, adds 
additional insureds “but only with respect to liability arising out of” either “your work for that 
insured by or for you” (1985 version) or “your ongoing operations performed for that insured” 
(1993 version).  Id.  A third endorsement, the ISO CG 20 33, adds as an additional insured any 
entity the named insured is contractually required to provide coverage for by changing the 
classification of “Who is Insured” in the policy.  Coverage is limited to the work, operations, or 
facilities of the named insured.  Id. 
 36. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58; Thomas, supra note 2. 
 37. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 8. 
 38. Cubbage, supra note 25, at 1. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 2.  Construction defect claims can drag on for years and result in significantly large 
settlements.  For example, a decade-long Florida case recently ended with a $9 million verdict 
awarded to fewer than 200 plaintiffs after a brand new courthouse was evacuated due to 
complaints of mold growth.  Id. 
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including vicarious liability for his subcontractor’s negligence.41  Additional 
insured endorsements are one way to allocate these risks in a way that probably 
would not have occurred under common law in the absence of the contract.42  
The original rationale for this contractual risk transfer was to make the party 
with the most control over the risk responsible for suffering the financial loss 
should it fail to prevent the loss from occurring.43  Recently, recognizing the 
great potential these additional insured endorsements can have, general 
contractors have begun to insist on them for many more reasons. 
A. Protecting His Own Insurance Policy 
A general contractor does not want to deplete his own insurance to defend 
claims, and he would prefer to involve the carrier to whom he is not paying a 
premium when a claim arises.44  Although it has not been litigated in all 
jurisdictions, courts have held that by tendering his defense to the 
subcontractor’s insurer, the general contractor is assuring that his insurance 
company will not be brought into the suit.45  This is known as a “targeted 
tender.”46  The general contractor, as the additional insured on the 
subcontractor’s policy, has the right to choose which insurer will defend him in 
a lawsuit: his own or the subcontractor’s.47  If he chooses to tender his defense 
 
 41. John H. Mathias, Jr. & Timothy W. Burns, General Contractors and Subcontractors’ 
Insurers: The Additional Insured Provision, 89 ILL. B.J. 526, 526 (Oct. 2001). 
 42. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58.  In absence of a contract, the customary method of 
allocating risk involved the court’s distinguishing between active and passive fault of the parties.  
Id. at 44.  Under common law, parties had to provide compensation only when their conduct 
violated rules of negligence.  Mehta, supra note 7, at 171. 
 43. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58.  The thought of most general contractors is that 
since the subcontractors perform most of the daily work at the construction site, they rightly 
deserve all the blame for most workplace accidents and faulty construction claims.  Cubbage, 
supra note 25, at 3.  While many injuries and defects are the fault of the subcontractors, it is 
unreasonable of general contractors to evade responsibility for all claims.  See infra notes 235-
238 and accompanying text. 
 44. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.C.11; Mathias & Burns, supra note 41, at 526; 
Gary D. Nelson, “Additional Insured” Endorsements: Conflicting Expectations, 24 THE BRIEF 
29, 67 (1995).  Additional insured coverage nearly always results in two or more policies 
covering the same incident.  Many issues are raised when this occurs, and this note only discusses 
one of these.  For discussion of these “other insurance” issues, see Douglas R. Richmond, Issues 
and Problems in “Other Insurance,” Multiple Insurance, and Self Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 
1373 (1995); Richmond, Additional Problems, supra note 32, at 984-99. 
 45. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.C.21.  As will be discussed later in this note, a 
majority of courts hold that the subcontractor’s insurance company will still have an obligation to 
pay defense and judgment costs even if the defect or injury was caused by the general 
contractor’s sole negligence, if the general contractor has been named as an additional insured on 
the subcontractor’s policy. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 796 N.E.2d 1133, 
1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); John Burns Constr. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 727 N.E.2d 211, 215 (Ill. 
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to the subcontractor’s insurer and requests no defense or indemnification from 
his own insurer, the subcontractor’s insurer is then precluded from suing the 
general contactor’s insurer for reimbursement of any money paid out on the 
general contractor’s behalf.48  The general contractor will thus not be 
responsible for paying any deductible, nor will his premiums increase or his 
policy be cancelled, as his insurer will not be involved in paying any losses. 
B. Preventing Subrogation 
Additional insured status precludes the subcontractor’s insurer from suing 
the general contractor directly if the general contractor caused the loss.49  
Normally, insurers have the right of subrogation, which is the legal right to 
pursue recovery from third parties who are legally to blame for the loss.50  
However, an insurer has no right of subrogation against its insured, which 
includes an entity that holds the status of an additional insured.51  While some 
jurisdictions limit the protection an additional insured has from subrogation, it 
seems well settled that an additional insured is immune from subrogation so 
long as the money paid out was within the defined scope of the additional 
insured coverage.52 
C. Reinforcing the Indemnity Agreement 
Additional insured status achieves the same result as an indemnity 
agreement without relying on the indemnity clause and without the hassles that 
accompany indemnity agreements.53  Additional insured status gives the 
general contractor direct rights to the subcontractor’s insurance policy.54  
Unlike an indemnity clause where the general contactor must pay costs out of 
his own pocket and then wait for reimbursement, additional insured status 
provides immediate coverage for defense costs.55  The situation can become 
 
2000); Inst. of London Underwriters v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1992); MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 131. 
 48. See Inst. of London Underwriters, 599 N.E.2d at 1313. 
 49. Mehta, supra note 7, at 175. 
 50. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.4; Mehta, supra note 7, at 175. 
 51. Frank Briscoe Co. v. Georgia Sprinkler Co., 713 F.2d 1500, 1502 (11th Cir. 1983); 
Airlines Reporting Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1458, 1464 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995); Reeder v. Reeder, 348 N.W.2d 832, 836 (Neb. 1984); see Winkelmann v. Excelsior 
Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 841, 843 (N.Y. 1995); First Nat’l Bank of Columbus v. Hansen, 267 N.W.2d 
367, 371 (Wis. 1978).  See also MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 79; Hendrick, supra note 34, at 
614.  Courts feel that allowing subrogation against its own insured places the insurer’s own 
interest at variance with its insured since the insurer has less incentive to defend claims.  See 
MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 80. 
 52. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.4. 
 53. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58. 
 54. Id. at 75; Mehta, supra note 7, at 177. 
 55. See MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 75; Mehta, supra note 7, at 176-77. 
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more problematic if the subcontractor refuses to pay the general contractor, as 
the general contractor must then expend more money to file a breach of 
contract claim against the subcontractor.  Additional insured status prevents 
this.  As soon as he learns of the case, the general contractor can tender the 
defense directly to the subcontractor’s insurer, who must pay as the costs are 
incurred.56  Additional insured status also results in the duty to defend 
beginning at the time the claim is made, as opposed to indemnity agreements 
in which the duty to defend may not arise until later in the proceeding, such as 
after a ruling that the indemnitor was at fault.57 
D. Circumventing the Indemnity Agreement 
Additional insured status is a clever method to circumvent some states’ 
prohibitions against broad form indemnities.58  Even though most courts will 
not allow the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for his own 
negligence, courts do allow the subcontractor to provide both defense and 
judgment coverage for the general contractor’s own negligence if there is an 
additional insured endorsement in place.59  This situation arises most 
frequently when the agreement is a broad form indemnity (agreeing to 
indemnify for the general contractor’s sole negligence) because most states 
have passed laws invalidating such agreements as against public policy.60  
However, a majority of courts have held that providing another party with 
insurance coverage is not the same as indemnifying that party, thus general 
contractors can be covered for their sole negligence.61  After the court holds 
 
 56. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 78; Mehta, supra note 7, at 177. 
 57. Mehta, supra note 7, at 178. 
 58. See MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 62; WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.2; 
Mehta, supra note 7, at 178. 
 59. Mehta, supra note 7, at 181. 
 60. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.2.  See also supra note 21 and accompanying 
text.  As of 2003, only 8 states have not passed any type of law regarding indemnity provisions.  
They are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Vermont, and Wyoming.  
American Subcontractors Association, Inc., Subcontractor’s Chart of Anti-Indemnity Statutes, at 
http://www.asaonline.com/pdf/AntiIndemnityChart.pdf (last updated May 2, 2003). 
 61. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.2.  Such cases include Shell Oil Co. v Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (state 
law invalidating broad form indemnities does not outlaw an agreement to procure insurance for 
another party’s sole negligence); Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Bragg Crane & Rigging Co., 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (there is no limit in obtaining insurance despite the fact that state 
law limits the amount of risk that can be transferred in an indemnity contract); Heat & Power 
Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc., 578 A.2d 1202 (Md. 1990) (although state law prohibited 
broad form indemnity agreements, a party insured under the indemnitor’s liability policy can be 
insured against its sole fault); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 517 N.Y.S.2d 
44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (the additional insured was ordered to be protected by the named 
insured’s policy even after the indemnity agreement between the parties was held void as against 
public policy). 
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the broad form indemnity agreement between the subcontractor and general 
contractor unenforceable, the general contractor can simply look for coverage 
directly under the subcontractor’s insurance policy and achieve the same 
result.62 
VI.  EVOLUTION OF THE COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF 
ADDITIONAL INSURED ENDORSEMENTS 
It is not disputed that all the provisions of an insurance policy that apply to 
the named insured also apply to the additional insured.63  However, whether 
the additional insured should be covered for his own acts of negligence, or 
covered only if the additional insured is held vicariously liable for acts of the 
named insured, is disputed.  Additional insured endorsements began as a risk 
shifting tool to cover the general contractor’s costs should he be found 
vicariously liable for an act of his subcontractor.64  It was with this purpose in 
mind that the courts originally interpreted these provisions to allow coverage 
only when the additional insured was held vicariously liable for acts of the 
named insured.65 
A case illustrative of the courts’ original interpretation of additional 
insured endorsements is Harbor Insurance Co. v. Lewis.66  In this case, the 
City of Philadelphia attempted to obtain coverage for a three million dollar 
verdict that had been entered against both the city and the Reading Railroad.  
The verdict came after a trial in which the plaintiff, a young boy, alleged that 
he suffered severe injuries after being run over by a train operated by the 
Reading Railroad in an area located near a fence that had been negligently 
maintained by the City of Philadelphia.  The city had been named an additional 
insured on Reading’s insurance policy, issued by Harbor Insurance (“Harbor”).  
The additional insured endorsement stated that the City of Philadelphia was 
provided insurance as an additional insured on the policy issued to the railroad, 
but “only to the extent of liability resulting from occurrences arising out of 
negligence of Reading Company and/or its wholly owned subsidiaries.”67 
The Harbor Court made several findings of fact before announcing its 
decision.  The court found that additional insured provisions are “intended to 
 
 62. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.2. 
 63. Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 313 P.2d 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); 
Hendrick, supra note 34, at 624.  The Oakland Court held that the additional insured endorsement 
incorporated all exclusions included in the main policy.  Any other holding, the court stated, 
would put the additional insured in a better position than the named insured who paid the 
premium and would accordingly be “absurd.”  Oakland Stadium, 313 P.2d at 605. 
 64. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 624. 
 65. Id. 
 66. 562 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1983).  All facts in this paragraph are taken from pages 801-
02 of the court’s opinion. 
 67. Id. at 801. 
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protect parties who are not named insureds from exposure to vicarious liability 
for acts of the named insured.”68  The court further found that Harbor did not 
charge any additional premium for the additional insured endorsement and that 
insurers typically will not increase or change the risks insured against without 
charging an additional premium.69  The court went on to discuss the intent of 
the parties, finding that Harbor intended this endorsement to be a routine 
endorsement issued to cover additional insureds for vicarious liability that 
might result from acts of the named insured.70  The court also pointed out that 
the City of Philadelphia stipulated that it did not look to or rely on the Harbor 
policy when making its own insurance decisions.71 
Based on the language in the policy as well as the intent of the parties, the 
court found that Harbor agreed to the additional insured endorsement only 
because its coverage was restricted to the City of Philadelphia’s vicarious 
liability for Reading Railroad’s activities.72  The court concluded that the City 
of Philadelphia was not covered for liability resulting from its own 
negligence.73 
The court in American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline74 made similar 
findings and limited the general contractor’s coverage as an additional insured 
to vicarious liability.  This court similarly recognized that the subcontractor 
received an unlimited number of additional insured endorsements for a single 
$150 premium; thus, it made sense that the additional insured should only 
receive coverage for a narrow group of claims (i.e., those arising in strict 
liability).75  The court went on to recognize that it would be inequitable to 
allow the additional insured to avoid its responsibility for its own conduct and 
to seek full coverage when the insurer has not been compensated 
accordingly.76  The court noted that the general contractor carried his own 
general liability coverage to cover liability arising from his own work.77  If the 
general contractor wanted the same level of coverage that he already received 
from his own insurer, then the subcontractor’s insurer should have received a 
larger premium payment.78 
 
 68. Id. at 803. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Harbor Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. at 804. 
 72. Id. at 805. 
 73. Id. at 805-06. 
 74. 722 N.E.2d 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 75. Id. at 761-62. 
 76. Id. at 762. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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Although the court in Granite Construction v. Bituminous Insurance Co.79 
did not make any specific findings, it nevertheless limited coverage of the 
additional insured.  In this case, Granite Construction (“Granite”) sought 
coverage for a lawsuit brought by an employee of Joe Brown Company 
(“Brown”), a subcontractor hired by Granite to haul asphalt materials from its 
construction site.  By contract, Granite agreed to load the trucks that Brown 
was to use to haul the asphalt. Brown had obtained insurance and named 
Granite as an additional insured on the policy.  The endorsement read, “The 
‘Persons Insured’ provision is amended to include as an insured the person or 
organization named below [Granite] but only with respect to liability arising 
out of operations performed for such insured [Granite] by or on behalf of the 
named insured [Brown].” 
A Brown employee was injured and filed a negligence action against 
Granite, claiming that Granite had negligently loaded its truck in such a 
manner that the truck had overturned and injured him.80  Granite then asserted 
that it was entitled to coverage under the additional insured endorsement.81  
The court, however, rejected that argument, stating that the endorsement 
restricted the carrier’s liability to those acts specifically performed by Brown 
and did not extend to operations performed by Granite itself.82  Because the 
complaint stated that Granite’s liability arose out of its own loading operations, 
it was not a claim “arising out of operations performed for [Granite] by or on 
behalf of [Brown].”83  Therefore, the Texas appellate court held that Brown’s 
insurance carrier owed no obligation to defend Granite on those claims.84 
The court in Valentine v. Aetna Insurance Co. recognized that “it would be 
unreasonable to assume that a subcontractor would agree to procure liability 
insurance for all of the general contractor’s operations . . . .”85  The court in 
Anaconda Co. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp.86 made a 
similar finding.  In this case the owner, Anaconda, required his general 
contractor, McKee, to name him as an additional insured on his liability policy, 
insuring against risks of any kind relating to the construction at its smelter 
facilities.87  Later, one of McKee’s subcontractor’s employees was injured 
when an Anaconda employee dropped a plank some thirty feet striking him.88 
 
 79. 832 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App. 1992).  All facts in this paragraph are taken from page 428 
of the court’s opinion. 
 80. Id. at 428. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 430. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Granite Constr. Co., 832 S.W.2d at 430. 
 85. 564 F.2d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 86. 616 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1980). 
 87. Id. at 364. 
 88. Id. 
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He filed suit against Anaconda, alleging that the negligence of Anaconda’s 
employee caused his injury.89  Anaconda made a formal demand to McKee’s 
insurer, General Accident, requesting a defense, and the insurance company 
denied coverage.90  In the ensuing case, to determine whether General 
Accident owed a duty to defend Anaconda, the court acknowledged, 
Were we to focus merely on the activities of the injured workman and 
not the activities of the named insureds [McKee], we would render 
application of [the contract] overly broad and make General Accident 
the insurer of all Anaconda activities at the Smelter that resulted in 
injuries to anyone working pursuant to the contract, regardless of 
control and benefit.  This Court will place no such burden on anyone.91 
These cases demonstrate the courts’ concern for the inequality of placing 
the burdens of defense and indemnification on a party who has very little 
control in preventing that loss from occurring.  They also demonstrate that the 
courts are willing to follow both the intent of the parties and the plain language 
of the endorsements.  Courts are not straining to find coverage for the 
additional insured because they recognize that the general contractor carries his 
own insurance to cover his own operations. 
VII.  EMERGING INTERPRETATION 
Developers and general contractors have become more sophisticated over 
the last decade.92  They now assert that additional insured coverage is intended 
to protect them from their own liability as well.93  Unfortunately, courts have 
listened to them.  The reason for this shift is not entirely clear.  One 
commentator suggests that it is because the courts do not have an 
understanding of the parties’ contractual relationship and have failed to 
appreciate the unique circumstances involved in an additional insured 
controversy.94  Therefore, they are blindly treating disputes over additional 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Anaconda Co., 616 P.2d at 366. 
 92. Richard H. Glucksman & Glenn T. Barger, Additional Insured Endorsements: Their 
Vital Importance in Construction Defect Litigation, 21 WTR CONSTR. L. 30, 30 (2001). 
 93. Id.  For years, parties paid little attention to additional insured policies until economic 
pressures in the construction industry in the 1990s changed the focus.  Parties began to pursue 
aggressively claims for recovery of costs and contribution to claim settlements.  Thomas, supra 
note 2. 
 94. Mark Pomerantz, Recognizing the Unique Status of Additional Named Insureds, 53 
FORDHAM L. REV. 117, 120 (1984).  Although Mr. Pomerantz’s contentions apply to what he 
refers to as “additional named insureds,” for purposes of this note his definition of “additional 
named insureds” is analogous to “additional insureds” discussed in this note.  “This [an additional 
named insured] is an entity specifically designated as an insured subsequent to the issuance of the 
original policy.  A party typically becomes an additional named insured pursuant to an agreement 
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insured coverage just as they would disputes over coverage for the named 
insured.95  Whatever the reason, however, liberal interpretation of additional 
insured endorsements is quickly becoming the majority rule.96 
Courts now broadly construe any and all language contained in these 
endorsements, striving to find coverage for the additional insured general 
contractor.  Because most endorsements contain some form of the language, 
“but only with respect to liability arising out of the named insured’s work,” 
this note will focus on the courts’ interpretation of these phrases.97 
A. “Arising Out Of” 
One commentator recently noted that “‘arising out of’ has been construed 
to be so broad and general as to cover virtually anything having the least bit to 
do with the named insured’s work.”98  Several cases illustrate this point.  A 
California appellate court in Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Syufy Enterprises 
required only a minimal showing of causation to find the insurer had a duty to 
defend the additional insured.99  The plaintiff, an employee of C&C, the 
general contractor, was injured while climbing through a hatch on the roof that 
had been negligently maintained by the building owner, Syufy Enterprises 
(“Syufy”).100  He sued the owner for his injuries.101  The endorsement adding 
Syufy as an additional insured provided that Syufy was included as an insured 
under the policy, “but only with respect to liability arising out of ‘your work’ 
for that insured by or for you.”102  The policy stated that “you” and “your” 
referred to C&C, the named insured.103  It defined “your work” as “[w]ork or 
operations performed by you or on your behalf.”104  The owner tendered his 
defense to the contractor’s insurer, Acceptance Insurance Co. (“Acceptance”), 
even though the owner was himself fully insured.105  Acceptance attempted to 
deny coverage by claiming that the plaintiff was injured while exiting the roof 
 
obligating the named insured to add the additional named insured to the named insured’s pre-
existing policy.” Id. at 119. 
 95. Id. at 120. 
 96. Richmond, Additional Problems, supra note 32, at 958; Douglas R. Richmond & Darren 
S. Black, Expanding Liability Coverage: Insured Contracts and Additional Insureds, 44 DRAKE 
L. REV. 781, 801 (1996); Cusack, supra note 2. 
 97. For an extensive compilation of courts’ interpretations of a variety of additional insured 
endorsements, see Nelson, supra note 44. 
 98. Lawrence A. Steckman & James J. Cleary Jr., Construction Industry AIE’s: Problems of 
Contract Interpretation and Solutions, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 78, 90 (1998). 
 99. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enters., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
 100. Id. at 323. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 324. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Acceptance Ins. Co., 69 Cal. App. 4th at 324. 
 105. Id. 
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through the hatch and that his work was limited to the roof itself.106  Therefore, 
Acceptance claimed that the injury did not “arise out of” the named insured’s 
work.107  In addition, Acceptance argued that the endorsement should be 
limited to situations where the owner is held vicariously liable for acts of the 
contractor.108 
The court rejected Acceptance’s arguments noting that “arising out of” 
language “[d]oes not import any particular standard of causation or theory of 
liability into an insurance policy.  Rather, it broadly links a factual situation 
with the event creating liability, and connotes only a minimal causal 
connection or incidental relationship.”109  The court found that, because the 
plaintiff could not have done his work without passing through the hatch, the 
connection between the injury and the work was more than incidental; thus, the 
“arising out of” requirement was satisfied.110  The fact that the defect was 
solely caused by Syufy’s negligence was irrelevant.111 
Similarly, in Shell Oil Co. v. AC & S, Inc., Shell Oil Co. (“Shell”) filed a 
declaratory judgment action against two subcontractors and their insurers 
claiming that it was entitled to defense and indemnity for a personal injury suit 
filed against Shell by one of the subcontractor’s employees.112  Shell was the 
owner of the property and had hired Bechtel as the general contractor.113  
Bechtel hired Sachs as a subcontractor, who in turn hired AC & S as his 
subcontractor.114  The plaintiff, Neels, was an employee of AC & S.115  The 
contract between Sachs and AC & S incorporated by reference the contract 
between Shell and Bechtel.116  Pursuant to those contracts, AC & S and Sachs 
each obtained general liability policies naming Shell as an additional 
insured.117 
Neels was injured when he tripped over a pipe on Shell’s premises.118  
Neither AC & S nor Sachs was alleged to be at fault.  In fact, it was undisputed 
that neither of them was in any way responsible for the pipe.119  When Shell 
 
 106. Id. at 326. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 330-31. 
 109. Acceptance Ins. Co., 69 Cal. App. 4th at 328. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 328-29. 
 112. Shell Oil Co. v. AC & S, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 946, 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Shell Oil Co., 649 N.E.2d at 948. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 951-52. 
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tendered its defense to AC & S’s and Sach’s insurers, respectively National 
Union and Transamerica, both refused coverage.120 
Both endorsements naming Shell as an additional insured contained similar 
language and the phrase “arising out of.”121  The court noted that the phrase 
“arising out of” is both broad and vague and therefore “must be liberally 
construed in favor of the insured; accordingly, ‘but for’ causation, not 
necessarily proximate causation, satisfies this language.”122  National Union 
argued that the endorsement unambiguously limited coverage to work 
performed by the subcontractors and that the pipe over which Neels tripped 
had nothing to do with the work being performed by either subcontractor.123  
Additionally, it was Shell, the additional insured, that had drafted the “arising 
out of” language, giving National Union the added argument that if the phrase 
was ambiguous, it should be construed against Shell.124  Nevertheless, the 
court held that Neels’s injuries arose from the subcontractor’s operations 
because Neels would not have been on Shell’s premises “but for” the 
operations of the subcontractor, his employer.125  The court ruled in favor of 
Shell, ordering it to be covered as an additional insured for both defense and 
indemnity purposes.126 
In summary, in the preceding two cases the named insured did absolutely 
nothing wrong.  However, in both cases because of the expansive reading of 
the additional insured endorsement by the court, the faultless named insured 
was forced to pay anyway. 
 
 120. Id. at 948. 
 121. Id. at 950. 
 122. Shell Oil Co., 649 N.E.2d at 951. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 952. 
 126. Id.  The list goes on and on.  Other cases supporting broad interpretation of “arising out 
of” language in additional insured endorsements include: Merch. Ins. Co. of New Hampshire v. 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 143 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1998); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 683 N.E. 2d 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Turner Constr. Co., 
601 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Lim v. Atlas-Gem Erectors Co., 225 A.2d 304 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1996); Township of Springfield v. Ersek, 660 A.2d 672 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).  In 
addition, slight deviations from the “arising out of” language are of no benefit to insurers and 
subcontractors.  See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Regis Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.96-CIV-1790, 1997 
WL 164268 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1997) (“as a result of” language imposed no greater causation than 
“arising out of”); Con’t Heller Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996) (“resulting from” the named insured’s work standard is met even when the injured 
named insured’s employee was just fetching some tools); Travelers Indem. Co. v. LLJV Dev. 
Corp., 643 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“by or on behalf of” language included 
operations performed by additional insured employee’s operations). 
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B. “Your Work” 
In addition to broadly construing the phrase “arising out of,” courts also 
broadly construe the term “your work.”  A commentator noted: 
Absent an extremely clear and unambiguous restriction on an 
additional insured endorsement, it is clear that the courts will interpret 
such endorsements to provide full coverage for the additional insured 
not only for vicarious liability, but also for acts of its own negligence, 
as long as they are related to the work contemplated in the underlying 
agreement.127 
In Pardee Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West, the appellate 
court held that the unambiguous language of the policies and endorsements 
provided the general contractor (the additional insured) with coverage for 
completed operations of the subcontractors (the named insureds).128  In this 
case the general contractor, Pardee Construction Co. (“Pardee”), had been 
named as an additional insured on all of his subcontractors’ policies for a 
project in San Diego.129  When the owners sued him a few years later for 
various construction defects, he tendered his defense to all of his 
subcontractors’ insurers, four of whom denied coverage claiming that 
additional insured coverage did not apply to completed operations.130  The 
endorsements provided Pardee coverage for liability arising out of the 
subcontractor’s work for Pardee.131  The subcontract itself between Pardee and 
his subcontractors defined the phrase “your work” as “Your work will be 
deemed completed at the earliest of the following times: (1) when the work 
called for in your contract has been completed. . . or (2) when that part of the 
work to be done at the job site has been put to its intended use. . . .”132  
However, the court refused to look beyond the language in the endorsement or 
in the insurance policies to consider the language of the subcontract.  The court 
held that the unambiguous language of the policies and endorsements provided 
Pardee with coverage for completed operations of the named insured 
subcontractors.133  The court noted that the policy provided coverage limited 
only by the phrase “liability arising out of your [the named insured’s] work for 
the [additional insured] by or for you.”134  The court stated that “the insurers 
failed to expressly limit covered completed operations as to time or particular 
 
 127. Joel M. Simon, Coverage for the Additional Insured, N.Y. L. J., Jan 8, 1996, at 1. 
 128. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 129. See id. at 446-47. 
 130. Id. at 447-49. 
 131. Id. at 454. 
 132. Id. at 455 n.13. 
 133. Pardee Constr. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453-54. 
 134. Id. at 454. 
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project in their policy and endorsement language.  [Such failure] implies a 
manifested intent not to do so.”135 
Courts have also held that if the subcontractor installs the work, it is “his 
work” for purposes of additional insured endorsement interpretation, regardless 
of whether or not the work deviates from the original subcontract.  In Travelers 
Indemnity Co. v Westfield Insurance Co., Hoar Construction (“Hoar”) was the 
general contractor for the renovation of a department store. 136  The installation 
of the floor coverings was subcontracted out to Turner Brook, Inc. (“Turner”), 
who was insured by the Westfield Insurance Co. (“Westfield”).137  Under the 
subcontractor’s agreement, Turner was required to install flooring first and 
then paper to protect it.138  However, when other aspects of the project outside 
Turner’s control fell behind, it became apparent that more heavy construction 
work would occur after the floor was laid than originally anticipated.139  Hoar 
instructed Turner to use more durable Masonite panels instead of paper to 
protect the floor.140 
An employee of another subcontractor sustained injuries after allegedly 
tripping over a piece of Masonite and brought suit against the property owner 
and general contractor.141  Hoar had been named as an additional insured on 
Turner’s policy, “but only with respect to liability arising out of your 
[Turner’s] work.”142  The general contractor tendered his defense to Westfield, 
Turner’s insurer, who refused coverage.143  Westfield argued that because the 
injured employee alleged that the Masonite panels had caused his injury, the 
panels did not “arise out of” but were merely incidental to Turner’s work.144  
The court, noting that broad and ambiguous language must be strictly 
construed against the insurer to maximize coverage, rejected this argument and 
ordered Westfield to defend Hoar in the underlying claim.145  The court also 
concluded that no level of causation is required for determining when liability 
“arises out of” a subcontractor’s work.146 
 
 135. Id. at 454, 456. 
 136. No. 97-2190, 1999 WL 98586, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 1999). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Travelers Indem. Co., 1999 WL 98586 at *1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at *3. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Travelers Indem. Co., 1999 WL 98586 at *3. 
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C. Broad Duty to Defend 
Courts continue to expand the liability of subcontractors and their 
insurance companies.  Not only do they bend over backwards to construe the 
endorsement language against the insurer, but there is also a growing majority 
finding that the duty to defend means that the insurer selected to defend owes 
the additional insured a complete and prompt defense, even though other 
insurers may well be equally responsible to defend the claim.147  This situation 
most commonly arises when the general contractor has been named an 
additional insured on several of his subcontractors’ policies.  If a case is 
tendered to him, the insurer must fully fund the defense and may not argue 
about which portions of the lawsuit are covered and which are not and/or 
which insurers are obligated to concurrently fund portions of the defense 
costs.148  This was confirmed in the case of Presley Homes, Inc. v. American 
States Insurance Co.149  In this case, various homeowners sued Presley Homes 
(“Presley”), a real estate development company, for defects in the construction 
of their homes.150  Presley sought coverage for the suit pursuant to additional 
insured agreements it had procured with several of its subcontractors.151  Two 
of those subcontractors had policies with American States Insurance 
(“American States”).152  American States agreed that it had a duty to defend 
Presley but claimed that its defense obligation was limited to the claims 
involving work performed by its named insured subcontractors, and thus it 
only offered to pay a percentage of Presley’s defense costs.153  When Presley 
and American States could not come to an agreement on a defense, Presley 
demanded a “full and complete defense” from American States.154  The court 
agreed with Presley and held that American States carried not just an equitable 
portion of the defense, but it was also obligated to defend Presley, fully and 
completely, in the entire action.155  American States was thereafter fully 
empowered to seek equitable contribution from all other potentially 
responsible carriers but could not rely on its endorsement to limit the defense 
obligation that it had to Presley, the additional insured.156  Essentially, the 
holding of this case is that when the additional insured seeks a defense from a 
 
 147. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.C.19. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686 (Cal Ct. App. 
2001).  For one commentator’s view on how this case has changed the duty to defend, see David 
Ezra, How Presley Homes Has Changed the Duty to Defend, 26 L.A. LAW. 17 (2003). 
 150. Presley Homes, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 688. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Presley Homes, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690. 
 156. See id. 
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carrier that has named it as an additional insured, the additional insured is 
entitled to a full and complete defense, notwithstanding the fact that the named 
insured is not fully responsible for all damages arising out of the project.157  
The case further confirms that the duty to defend is a broad one and will 
implicate any carrier, regardless of how potentially small his indemnity 
obligation may be.158 
VIII.  WHAT THE COURTS ARE NOT SEEING 
When interpreting these additional insured endorsements, the courts’ 
attitude seems to reflect the impression that this is only the insurance 
company’s money, and that insurance exists for the protection of the insured.  
Courts do not seem to consider or even recognize the impact on the 
subcontractor when its policy is called upon to defend.  Broad interpretation of 
these additional insured endorsements dramatically increases the number of 
times the subcontractor’s insurer becomes involved in lawsuits and has several 
detrimental effects on the subcontractor. 
A. Policy Dilution 
Affording broad additional insured coverage dilutes the subcontractor’s 
policy limits.159  In a large construction dispute, there are surely other insureds 
permitted to make claims against the same policy, and thus the policy’s limits 
can become depleted quickly.160  With so many parties entitled to make claims 
against the named insured’s policy, the probability exists that claims by these 
additional insureds may exhaust coverage in favor of additional insureds and 
leave the named insured without coverage, or worse, exposed to any 
unsatisfied additional insureds.161  Even if only one other party is making 
claims against the subcontractor’s policy, every dollar paid out on his behalf 
reduces money available for the subcontractor. 
B. Increasing Premiums 
Allowing broad additional insured coverage that includes coverage for the 
negligent actions of others increases the potential for claims and losses.  
Because most subcontractors’ policies are not purchased on a project-by-
 
 157. See id. 
 158. It is this case that allows the general contractor and developer in our hypothetical to 
choose you, and only you, to defend them in the lawsuit.  They are neither responsible nor 
required to find any other potential subcontractors who may be at fault and are entitled to a full 
and complete defense from your insurance carrier. 
 159. Steckman & Cleary, supra note 97, at 82. 
 160. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 71; Hendrick, supra note 34, at 632. 
 161. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 642.  When the policy limits have been exhausted, the 
insurer is released from any further responsibility, whether it is to the additional insured or to the 
named insured.  Id. at 635. 
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project basis,162 the insurer maintains an experience rating of these claims and 
losses.163  The insurer then applies these claims and losses in the future when 
determining coverage and premiums for the subcontractor.164  In many cases, 
this can mean outright non-renewal of the policy and the inability to get 
coverage at any cost.165  If the carrier does agree to renew the policy, bad risk 
experience can only mean higher future premiums for the subcontractor.166  
This “hidden” cost is not fully passed on to the general contractor in the form 
of construction costs because it is not apparent at the time the subcontractor 
submits a price quote to the general contractor.167  The minimal fee charged to 
the subcontractor for the actual endorsement is only a portion of the 
subcontractor’s cost.168  Clearly it is the subcontractor alone who is bearing all 
of the future cost of the policy, not the general contractor who is only 
indirectly paying for a portion of the unaffected current risk.169  Ironically, the 
small subcontractor, bearing all the future costs, is the party least able to 
absorb the insurance costs caused by the negligence of other parties.170 
C. Deductibles 
Nearly all insurance policies have a deductible that must be satisfied before 
the policy will begin to pay for judgments, settlements, and, in some cases, 
defense costs.171  The named insured is liable for the deductible, which can 
range anywhere from a couple of thousand to a couple of million dollars.172  
Paying this deductible is not so problematic if the subcontractor has a great 
deal of liability on his own, as he would be responsible for it anyway.  
However, this becomes very problematic if the subcontractor is found to be 
completely without fault or at fault for only a couple of thousand dollars.  In 
such a situation, the subcontractor is being forced to pay the deductible out of 
his own pocket to satisfy the liabilities of another party.  This can present a 
severe hardship on the subcontractor, as most subcontractors are small entities 
 
 162. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Subcontractors Association at 7, Chrysler Corp. v. 
Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648 (Del. 2002) (No. 38-2001). 
 163. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 643. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Cubbage, supra note 25, at 1. 
 166. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 71; Hendrick, supra note 34, at 643; Brief of Amicus 
Curiae at 10, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001). 
 167. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 643. 
 168. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 7, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001). 
 169. Id.; see Hendrick, supra note 34, at 643. 
 170. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 12, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001). 
 171. See MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 71; Hendrick, supra note 34, at 644; Cubbage, 
supra note 25, at 1.  Some policies will pay defense costs immediately; the deductible must be 
paid only before the insurer will pay any settlement or judgment costs. 
 172. See MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 63. 
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with limited resources.173  Many subcontractors agree to large deductibles 
because large deductibles mean smaller premium payments; however, maxing 
out the deductible payment can devastate a small subcontractor. 
There is no difference between dollars paid by the subcontractor before the 
deductible has been met and dollars paid by the insurance company after the 
deductible has been exceeded.174  As mentioned previously, an insurer has no 
right of subrogation against its insured.175  Therefore, the subcontractor has no 
cause of action against the general contractor for money he has paid out to 
satisfy his deductible, even if the money paid out was due to the sole fault of 
the general contractor. 
D. No Accountability 
Normally, an insurance company has complete control over the defense of 
its insureds, which entails the right to select the lawyer for its insured.176  
However, in the additional insured context, the subcontractors providing the 
insurance are normally not named in the initial lawsuit but are brought in much 
later only because the general contactor has tendered his defense to the 
subcontractor’s insurer.  The general contactor thus has already selected his 
lawyer, who has already expended time on his client’s case. 
Insurers have an enhanced duty of good faith, and failure to satisfy this 
enhanced obligation may expose the insurer to liability.177  Thus, the insurer, 
not wanting to separate the general contractor from a lawyer who has already 
expended time on the lawsuit and potentially expose itself to bad faith 
damages, normally agrees to pay the lawyer the general contractor has already 
selected and waives its right to select counsel for the additional insured.178  
This puts the defense in the hands of lawyers who have little or no 
accountability as another insurer, and not their client, is paying the bills.179  It 
is an open invitation to do unnecessary work at someone else’s expense.180 
Even if the insurer does select counsel for the general contractor, it will, at 
the very least, have to select separate counsel for the general contractor and the 
 
 173. Berardi v. Getty Ref. & Mktg Co., 107 Misc. 2d 451, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
 174. E-mail from Jack O’Neil, General Counsel, The Western Group, (Jan. 9, 2004) (on file 
with author). 
 175. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
 176. Douglas R. Richmond, Walking a Tightrope: The Tripartite Relationship Between 
Insurer, Insured, and Insurance Defense Counsel, 73 NEB. L. REV. 265, 269 (1994) [hereinafter 
Richmond, Walking a Tightrope]. 
 177. Id. at 276-77.  For various bad faith issues that can arise specifically in the context of 
additional insured coverage, see Oonk, supra note 12, at 13-14. 
 178. E-mail from Jack O’Neil, General Counsel, The Western Group, (Aug. 26, 2003) (on file 
with author). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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subcontractor as these parties will nearly always have adverse interests (i.e., 
the subcontractor will be claiming the general contractor caused the building 
defect or injury, while the general contractor will be arguing the same against 
the subcontractor).  In such situations, the insurer has a duty to assign separate 
counsel for both parties.181  This leads to higher defense costs, which erode and 
reduce available coverage for the subcontractor. 
IX.  LEGAL ANALYSIS OF WHY THIS INTERPRETATION IS FLAWED 
A. Additional Insured Disputes Are Unique 
In construing these additional insured endorsements, courts are applying 
the well founded principle of insurance contract interpretation that all 
ambiguities in an insurance contract should be construed against the insurance 
company and in favor of coverage.182  However, this principle is not as suitable 
for determining coverage for the additional insured as it is for the named 
insured because the following two rationales for construing insurance contracts 
against the drafter are not applicable in the additional insured context. 
The first justification for construing all insurance terms against the 
insurance company is that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion for 
which the insurer supplies the terms.183  An adhesion contract is a form 
contract created by the stronger of the contracting parties and is offered on a 
“take it or leave it” basis.184  The terms are imposed upon the weaker party 
who has no choice but to agree because the weaker party is usually unable to 
look elsewhere for a more favorable contract.185  Therefore, all ambiguities 
 
 181. See Richmond, Walking a Tightrope, supra note 176, at 279. 
 182. In disputes over coverage for the additional insured, courts are applying this well 
founded principle of insurance law but offer only conclusory statements as to why this type of 
dispute should be treated in the same way that disputes over coverage for the named insured are.  
See, e.g., Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enter., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“This language [“arising out of”] does not import any particular standard of causation or theory 
of liability into an insurance policy”) (emphasis added); Maryland Cas. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 
65 Cal. App. 4th 21, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“Although Gray arose in the context of a defense 
duty owed to [a] named insured, its holding applies equally to an insured added by 
endorsement.”). 
 183. Greenly v. Mariner Mgmt. Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999); Great Divide 
Ins. Co. v. Carpenter ex rel. Reed, 79 P.3d 599, 606 (Alaska 2003); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Burr, 706 
A.2d 499, 500-01 (Del. 1998); First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Am. Sandblasting Co., 477 S.E.2d 390, 392 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Dairy Road Partners v. Island Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 93, 106-07 (Haw. 2000); 
Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 242, 245 (Idaho 2003); Masonic Temple Ass’n 
of Crawfordsville v. Indiana Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 799 N.E.2d 21, 27-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); 
Burge v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 933 P.2d 210, 219 (N.M. 1996); Symington v. Walle Mut. Ins. 
Co., 563 N.W.2d 400, 403 (N.D. 1997). 
 184. Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). 
 185. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE FOOD CHAIN LOOKING UP 721 
should be construed against the drafter and in favor of coverage because the 
insured did not supply any of the terms.186 
None of these factors are present in the additional insured context.  An 
additional insured is not forced to “take the policy or leave it,” but rather is 
asking to be added to a preexisting policy.187  The contract is not offered by the 
stronger insurance company, but by the subcontractor.  This lacks the 
oppressive features of an adhesion contract because it is the result of 
negotiation between two strong parties, the subcontractor and the general 
contractor.  If anything, the subcontractor is the weaker party, not the 
additional insured general contractor.  Additionally, the general contractor has 
many alternative places to turn.  There are literally hundreds of subcontractors 
that general contractors could turn to should one refuse to include the language 
he desires in the additional insured endorsement.  For these reasons, an 
additional insured endorsement is not a contract of adhesion. 
The second rationale for construing all insurance terms in favor of 
coverage is that public policy warrants providing injured parties with an 
adequate source of compensation.188  However, the additional insured general 
contractor nearly always has his own general liability insurance that will cover 
defense, judgment, and settlement costs.189  In many cases, because the general 
contractor is a more economically powerful entity, his insurance actually will 
be superior to his subcontractor’s and thereby will be an even larger source of 
compensation for the injured victim.  Therefore, in most cases, the rationale of 
ensuring that the injured party will be fully compensated does not apply in the 
additional insured context either. 
B. General Contractor Is Not a Party to the Contract 
When interpreting the scope of additional insured coverage, the same 
rights should not be afforded to additional insureds, who are not parties to the 
original insurance contract, as those given to named insureds, who are parties 
to the contract.190  First, the general contractor (the additional insured) is not a 
party to the original contract between the subcontractor and his insurer and is 
therefore not in the position to demand, as one of the contracting parties could, 
 
 186. Symington, 563 N.W.2d at 403. 
 187. Pomerantz, supra note 93, at 128-29. 
 188. Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648, 652 (Del. 2002); Bosio v. 
Branigar Org., 506 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Stickovich v. City of Cleveland, 757 
N.E.2d 50, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Pomerantz, supra note 93, at 128. 
 189. Am. Country Ins. v. Cline, 722 N.E.2d 755, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Nelson, supra note 
44, at 67; Oonk, supra note 12, at 12; Pomerantz, supra note 93, at 129; Richmond, Additional 
Problems, supra note 32, at 964. 
 190. Pomerantz, supra note 93, at 126-27. 
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that the contract be construed strictly against the other party.191  Second, the 
general contractor is urging a construction of the contract that is detrimental to 
both parties to the contract.  It makes the insurance company liable for 
damages for which its named insured may not be fully liable and payment 
which could only result in higher insurance premiums for the named insured.  
Therefore, the general contractor, who is not a party to the contract, is not in a 
position to urge a construction of the contract which would be unfavorable to 
both parties to the contract.192 
C. Public Policy 
The same public policy argument that is made for broad form indemnities 
can also be made for additional insured agreements.193  A party who knows he 
will not be financially responsible for any damages has little incentive to take 
any preventative measures to ensure his negligence does not hurt a third 
party.194  This lower degree of care, known as “moral hazard,” increases the 
likelihood of a loss or injury to a third party.195  The possibility of moral 
hazard should also be, but has rarely been, construed by the courts to restrict 
additional insured endorsements.196  Consequently, even when the broad form 
indemnity is declared unenforceable due to state law or otherwise, the 
subcontractor, in a majority of jurisdictions, may still be forced to save and 
hold harmless the general contractor if there is an additional insured 
endorsement in place.197  For example, in McAbee Construction Co. v. Georgia 
Kraft Co., the general contractor entered into a contract with the property 
owner which obligated the general contractor to save and hold harmless the 
 
 191. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1262 (Ohio 2003); Cook v. Kozell, 199 
N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ohio 1964). 
 192. Cook, 199 N.E.2d at 569. 
 193. Mehta, supra note 7, at 181. 
 194. Id. at 182. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 195. Mehta, supra note 7, at 182. 
 196. Id. at 183.  The court in Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Zavarella Bros. Constr. Co., 699 
N.E.2d 127, 130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), did base its decision to void the additional insured 
agreement on public policy grounds, as did the court in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 
Inc., 755 P.2d 52, 55 (N.M. 1988).  Others have based their decisions on notions of common 
sense and fairness.  Courts are mindful that they should interpret statutes to achieve common 
sense results and to avoid unreasonable or absurd results. Snell v. Engineered Sys. & Designs, 
Inc., 669 A.2d 13, 20 (Del. 1995).  To enforce an obligation to insure a party for its own 
negligence is inconsistent with a void indemnity obligation and is to do indirectly what cannot be 
done directly. See generally Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc., 578 A.2d 1202, 
1209 (Md. 1990) (Eldridge, J., dissenting); Walsh Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw, 76 P.3d 164 
(Or. Ct. App. 2003); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Subcontractors Association at 10, 
Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648 (Del. 2002) (No. 38-2001). 
 197. Mehta, supra note 7, at 183-84.  See also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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owner from liability.198  The court properly held that this indemnity provision, 
taken alone, would violate the Georgia law invalidating broad form 
indemnities.199  The court went on to hold, however, that because the 
contractor also added the owner as an additional insured, the owner had 
effectively transferred the risk of loss, even that arising from his own 
negligence, to the contractor.200  In doing so, the court made an unexplained 
distinction between indemnification and additional insured status and did not 
speak to how this “shifting the risk of loss” evaded the public policy arguments 
that it had already agreed voided broad form indemnities.201 
 
 198. McAbee Construction Co. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 343 S.E.2d 513, 514 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1986).  The indemnity provision read: 
The Contractor hereby assumes exclusive responsibility for all injury and/or damage to 
any and all persons whomsoever and to any property whatsoever, and loss of use, 
resulting from or arising out of the performance of the Work.  The Contractor further 
agrees to indemnify, hold harmless and defend the Owner against all claims, suits, losses, 
damages and costs, including, but not limited to, court costs and reasonable attorney’s 
fees, on account of such injury or damage, except when caused by the sole negligence of 
the Owner.  Provided, however, with respect to injury, including death, to any employees 
of the Contractor or any Subcontractor, the Contractor agrees to indemnify, hold harmless 
and defend the Owner from any claims, damages or suits filed against the Owner by any 
employees of the Contractor and/or any employees of any Subcontractor, even though 
such injury, including death, was caused by the sole negligence of the Owner. 
Id. 
 199. Id.  The Georgia statute invalidating broad form indemnities read: 
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to 
a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a 
building structure, appurtenances, and appliances, including moving, demolition, and 
excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify or hold harmless the promisee 
against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property 
caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, 
or indemnitee is against public policy and is void and unenforceable, provided that this 
subsection shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract, workers’ compensation, 
or agreement issued by an admitted insurer. 
Ga. Code Ann. § 13-8-2 (b) (1982). 
 200. McAbee Constr. Co., 343 S.E.2d at 515. 
 201. Mehta, supra note 7, at 185.  Many courts that have held similarly based their decisions 
on the insurance “savings clause” that many states have enacted along with their statutes 
invalidating broad form indemnities.  A typical insurance savings clause in an anti-indemnity 
statute reads, “Nothing in this section shall affect the validity of any insurance contract.”  The 
court reads the statute to disallow broad form indemnities but reads the savings clause to allow a 
party to procure insurance for another’s sole negligence.  Courts also contend that the policy 
argument for allowing one to provide insurance for another’s sole negligence outweighs the 
policy arguments against it.  See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648, 
652 (Del. 2002) (“From the viewpoint of the injured worker, the greater the amount of insurance 
available to respond to his claim, the better the prospect for full compensation.”); Bosio v. 
Branigar Org., 506 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“An agreement in a construction 
contract requiring a contractor to provide insurance protecting the owner also protects the interest 
of the construction worker and the general public by preserving a potential source of 
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In the traditional liability insurance situation, moral hazard can be avoided 
because the named insured will be charged higher premiums if he engages in 
activities that bring about greater risk.202  Additionally, to provide incentive for 
insureds to prevent loss, insurance companies may also reduce premiums if the 
named insured takes certain steps to reduce the risk of loss.203  However, the 
additional insured is shielded against these prospects because he is not 
responsible for premium payments to the insurer and is unaffected by the 
raising or lowering of premiums.204  Thus, an entity that is only paying a 
predetermined amount of the subcontractor’s current insurance cost has no 
incentive to act more responsibly.205 
D. Why the Court’s Solution Will Not Work 
1. No Bargaining Power 
In most of these decisions, the courts suggest a solution: had the parties 
intended for coverage for the sole negligence of the additional insured to be 
excluded, language embodying that intent was available and should have been 
used in the endorsement.206  However, this is much easier said than done.  In 
the negotiating process, subcontractors have little or no real bargaining power 
over the general contractor.207  Huge corporations exert disproportionate 
leverage over the contracting industry, and very few if any of these huge 
corporations are subcontractors.208  Many general contractors refuse to allow 
subcontractors to include limiting language in their additional insured 
endorsements, as they want the broadest coverage possible.  The general 
contractor can easily turn to the numerous other subcontractors available 
 
compensation for injured workers.”); Stickovich v. City of Cleveland, 757 N.E.2d 50, 59 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2001) (“In the context of insurance, one is more apt to encounter public-policy 
arguments to require coverage or to override policy exclusions, rather than to invalidate coverage, 
because the predominate social purpose of liability insurance is to compensate injured persons.”); 
Brzeczek v. Standard Oil Co., 447 N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (“Courts do not, as a 
general matter, look unfavorably on agreements which, by requiring parties to carry insurance, 
afford protection to the public.”). 
 202. Mehta, supra note 7, at 185. 
 203. Id. at 186. 
 204. Id. at 187. 
 205. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 8, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001). 
 206. McIntosh v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 251, 255 (10th Cir. 1993); Pardee Constr. Co. 
v. Ins. Co. of the West, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Acceptance Ins. Co. v. 
Syufy Enter., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ill. 1994); Consol. 
Edison Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 610 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
 207. Walsh Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw, 76 P.3d 164, 169 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); 
Steckman & Cleary, supra note 97, at 83. 
 208. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 8, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001). 
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should one refuse to include the language he desires in the additional insured 
endorsement.  The reality is that in order to get scarce construction work, it 
may be necessary to agree to additional insured status, and the stronger general 
contractor usually is successful in obtaining the broad coverage he desires.209 
2. Courts Will Find Coverage Illusory 
Even if the subcontractor is successful in negotiating an additional insured 
endorsement limiting coverage to vicarious liability, some courts will still go 
out of their way to construe the language against the insurer.  The words of 
Chief Justice Bilandic’s dissent in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park District represent the stance that 
some courts take towards additional insured agreements limiting coverage to 
vicarious liability; such coverage is illusory.210  He stated: 
NDS [the contractor] is an independent contractor and the Glenview Park 
District [the property owner] cannot be held vicariously liable for its 
acts except under a narrow exception. Even if it was to be held 
vicariously liable for the acts of NDS, the Glenview Park District 
would have an action for indemnity against NDS and, therefore, would 
have no need for vicarious liability coverage on the painting contract. 
The endorsement is illusory and provides no coverage at all.  [T]he 
endorsement’s exclusion violates public policy and should not be 
enforced.211 
The majority in this case, while basing its decisions on other grounds, did 
indicate that it would be willing to hear the argument that these types of 
exclusions are illusory and thus always unenforceable.212 
 
 209. See Berardi v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 451, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); 
Walsh Constr. Co., 76 P.3d at 169 (citing Audio Tape, House Committee on Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Business, SB 788, Tape 33, Slide A, (May 11, 1995) [statement of 
Representative Larry Wells]). 
 210. This argument has been made in several cases by general contractors seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the subcontractor’s insurance has the duty to defend and indemnify him 
for his own negligence, but as of yet has not been accepted by the courts.  See, e.g., Liberty Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Statewide Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. 
of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. R. Olson Constr. Contractors, Inc., 769 N.E.2d 977, 985 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2002); Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Kraemer Bros., Inc., 699 N.E.2d 1056 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); 
Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Cline, 722 N.E.2d 755, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).  The Liberty court even 
noted “[The general contractor] has not convinced us there are indications the tide is turning in its 
favor.”  Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 352 F.3d at 1101.  It still remains, however, a potentially 
viable argument for the general contractor to make. 
 211. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park Dist., 632 
N.E.2d 1039, 1046 (Ill. 1994) (Bilandic, C.J., dissenting). 
 212. Id. at 1043.  This same concept is also discussed in Douglas Richmond’s article, The 
Additional Problems of Additional Insureds.  He states that public policy may actually strengthen 
an argument for liability coverage for the additional insured’s sole negligence.  See Richmond, 
Additional Problems, supra note 32, at 964.  See also Hendrick, supra note 34, at 625. 
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3. Courts Will Ignore Exclusionary Language 
In addition to holding additional insured endorsements limiting coverage to 
vicarious liability illusory, courts may simply ignore clear exclusionary 
language.  Such was the case in Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass’n.213  
The Idaho Supreme Court, although not relying on public policy, refused to 
uphold a clear exclusion in the additional insured endorsement.214  In this case, 
Bonner County was covered under an additional insured endorsement that 
expressly and unambiguously excluded liability arising out of the County’s 
sole negligence.215  The endorsement excluded “liability of the [additional 
insured] arising out of [the additional insured’s] sole negligence.”216  In 
addition to promising to procure insurance for the County, Panhandle Rodeo 
Association (“Panhandle”) also agreed to hold the County harmless for any 
liability incurred as a result of the rodeo performance.217  Despite the general 
rule that courts must enforce a clear and unambiguous policy provision, the 
Bonner Court went outside the policy and interpreted its terms together with 
the underlying agreement between the County and Panhandle.218  Once it did 
so, the exclusion of liability caused by the additional insured’s sole negligence 
and the agreement to hold harmless for any liability incurred were at odds.  
The court stated, “Accordingly, we find, under the facts before us, the 
ambiguous circumstance in which a policy has been issued purportedly 
providing coverage but with exclusionary provisions which, if applied, would 
narrow that coverage to ‘defeat the very purpose or object of the 
insurance.’”219  Consequently, the exclusion was not given effect, and 
Panhandle’s insurer had a duty to defend the County on a claim indisputably 
arising out of the County’s sole negligence.220 
Another case similar to Bonner is Maryland Casualty Co. v. Nationwide 
Insurance Co.221  Again, the unambiguous language of the endorsement at 
issue in this case clearly limited coverage of the additional insured to instances 
when the additional insured was held vicariously liable for acts of the named 
insured.222  The court, notwithstanding the endorsement’s clear exclusions, 
ruled that the subcontractor’s insurer owed a duty to defend the general 
 
 213. Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass’n, 620 P.2d 1102 (Idaho 1980). 
 214. Id. at 1106-07. 
 215. Id. at 1104. 
 216. Id. at 1104. 
 217. Id. at 1103. 
 218. Bonner County, 620 P.2d at 1106-07. 
 219. Id. at 1106. 
 220. Id. at 1106-07.  In coming to this conclusion, the court disregarded the well established 
principle that courts should not strain to create ambiguities in an insurance policy where none 
exist.  See Richmond & Black, supra note 95, at 807 n.236. 
 221. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 222. Id. at 28. 
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contractor when the allegations of the complaint did not allege vicarious 
liability.223  In this case, Nielsen Construction Company (“Nielsen”) served as 
the general contractor of a construction project.224  Nielsen hired various 
subcontractors, including West Coast Sheet Metal (“West Coast”) and R.W. 
Strang Mechanical (“Strang”).225  The subcontractors’ agreements required the 
subcontractors to obtain general liability coverage and name to Nielsen as an 
additional insured.226  Nielsen was subsequently sued for various construction 
defects and tendered his defense to Nationwide, the company insuring both 
West Coast and Strang.227  The language of the endorsement read, “Who is an 
insured is amended to include as an insured [Nielsen] but . . . this insurance . . . 
applies only to the extent that [Nielsen] is held liable for [West Coast’s and 
Strang’s] acts or omissions . . . .”228 
The court acknowledged that this language did limit the scope of the 
subcontractors’ indemnity obligations to situations where Nielsen would be 
held vicariously liable for either West Coast’s or Strang’s actions.229  It went 
on, however, to disregard all the limiting language in the endorsement and 
stated that because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, 
Nationwide still owed a duty to defend Nielsen, even though Nielsen was fully 
covered by his own insurance policy.230 
4. Courts Will Strictly Construe the Limitation 
In addition to finding endorsement language attempting to limit additional 
insured coverage illusory or ignoring it completely, the court may strictly 
construe any limitation in the endorsement.  For example, if the complaint 
alleges anything other than common law negligence, such as the violation of a 
statute, the court may strictly construe the limitation to exclude only common 
law negligence and to find any other cause of action covered.  A case that 
illustrates this point is National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park District.231  In this case, National Decorating 
Service (“NDS”) and Glenview Park District (“Glenview”) entered into a 
contract for NDS to paint portions of the Glenview Ice Center.232  NDS named 
Glenview as an additional insured on its general liability policy issued by 
 
 223. Id. at 33-34. 
 224. Id. at 25. 
 225. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 25. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 28. 
 229. See id. at 31. 
 230. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 25, 31. 
 231. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park Dist., 632 
N.E.2d 1039 (Ill. 1994). 
 232. Id. at 1040. 
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National Union Fire Insurance Company (“National Union”).233  The 
endorsement stated that it extended coverage to additional insureds “with 
respect to operations performed by” the named insured.234  However, the 
endorsement also contained a clause that excluded from coverage “damages 
arising out of the negligence” of the additional insured.235 
During NDS’s performance of its contract with Glenview, one of NDS’s 
employees was injured after falling from a scaffold and filed suit against 
Glenview for his injuries.236  The complaint alleged that Glenview was liable 
under both the Structural Work Act and common law principles of 
negligence.237  Glenview tendered its defense to National Union, who refused 
coverage claiming the endorsement in NDS’s insurance policy excluded 
coverage for damages arising from Glenview’s “negligence,” which would 
include the claims for Structural Work Act violations and ordinary 
negligence.238  The court disagreed and ordered National Union to defend 
Glenview.  The court stated: 
[W]e find it significant that the explicit language of the endorsement 
refers solely to “damages arising out of the negligence” of the 
additional insured. In our view, this plain and unambiguous reference 
to “negligence” in the exclusionary provision of the present insurance 
policy is reasonably interpreted as a reference to the common law tort 
of negligence.  If National Union intended the term “negligence” to 
include allegations that the additional insured had committed a 
statutory tort, such as a violation of the Structural Work Act, it could 
have easily modified its insurance policy to so provide.239 
Having decided that National Union had a duty to defend Glenview on one 
count, the court then relied on existing Illinois law that an insurer, faced with a 
multi-count complaint only one count of which is covered, has an obligation to 
provide a full defense for all counts, even those which are not covered.240  The 
result in this case was that even after successfully negotiating contract terms 
excluding coverage for the negligence of the additional insured, the named 
insured’s carrier still had a duty to provide a full defense for claims resulting 
from the negligence of the additional insured. 
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X.  SOLUTION 
A. The Courts 
Because of the courts’ expansive interpretation of additional insured 
endorsements, the general contractor is essentially being handed coverage 
under the subcontractor’s policy even for the consequences of his own 
negligence, after the subcontractor’s work is finished and frequently 
completely outside the subcontractor’s knowledge or power to control.241  The 
preceding cases illustrate that the courts’ own suggestion to include limiting 
language in the endorsements will not work in some cases.  The courts have 
consistently demonstrated their belief that these endorsements should be 
construed as broadly as possible and will construe strictly or even ignore any 
limiting language to find such coverage.  Thus, it seems that the best solution 
lies with the courts themselves. 
The courts should follow the shrinking minority’s interpretation of 
additional insured endorsements and allow coverage for vicarious liability 
only.  The allegations in the complaint must be within the scope of coverage 
for imputed liability for the duties to defend or to indemnify to be triggered.  
Restricting coverage to vicarious liability is not illusory.  An illusory contract 
is defined as an agreement in which one party gives as consideration a promise 
that is so insubstantial as to impose no obligation.242  Such a limited 
endorsement does impose an obligation on the named insured’s insurance 
carrier: it must defend and indemnify the additional insured should he be 
alleged or be found vicariously liable for an act or omission of the named 
insured.  Simply because there are fewer vicarious liability claims than 
negligence claims does not make coverage illusory.243  The fact that the 
subcontractor was only charged a minimal amount to add the general 
contractor to his policy reflects the reality that only narrow exceptions should 
be covered.244  If the general contractor wishes to have the subcontractor 
procure coverage for all of his operations, he should pay more than a nominal 
endorsement fee.245 
The purpose of imposing liability on a party is not only to punish it for its 
wrongdoing, but to force it to consider whether steps should be taken to 
prevent a reoccurrence of the accident.246  Subcontractors are not in a position 
 
 241. See Hendrick, supra note 34, at 642; Cubbage, supra note 25, at 3; Brief of Amicus 
Curiae American Subcontractors Association at 9, Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 
796 A.2d 648 (Del. 2002) (No. 38-2001). 
 242. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (7th ed. 1999). 
 243. Am. Country Ins. v. Kraemer Bros., Inc., 699 N.E.2d 1056, 1062 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 244. See Nelson, supra note 44, at 29. 
 245. Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Cline, 722 N.E.2d 755, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
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to prevent all workplace defects and accidents and thus should not bear all the 
risk for them.  They do not dictate the work sequence that creates the 
conditions allowing many accidents to happen.247  Subcontractors do not 
design buildings.248  They cannot always ensure that their work will 
appropriately fit with work done by subsequent subcontractors, much less that 
their work will not be damaged by a subsequent subcontractor in a rush.249  
General contractors, on the other hand, are responsible for sequencing, 
inspecting, and coordinating projects and otherwise bringing the entire job 
together, so they cannot rationally evade all responsibility for worker injury 
and defect claims.250  The general contractor, the party with the most authority 
and power, is in the best position to prevent and to avoid mistakes. 
Pushing all liability onto the subcontractor, which is precisely the result of 
these expansive additional insured endorsement interpretations, is forcing the 
least able party to bear the cost for another’s negligence and is encouraging no 
one to take any steps to prevent future accidents.  In the previously discussed 
cases of Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Syufy Enterprises251 and Shell Oil v. AC 
& S, Inc.,252 the additional insureds were undisputedly solely at fault, yet still 
had to pay nothing.  By using their superior bargaining power to push 
insurance obligations down to weaker parties, the additional insureds have no 
incentive to take any precautionary measures to prevent such accidents again.  
For example, if the court in Shell Oil Co. would have read the Shell 
endorsement to cover only situations where the owner was alleged to be 
vicariously liable, the subcontractor’s insurer would not have become involved 
in any way.  Shell’s own insurance provider would have paid for its defense 
and any judgments against it.  This is a fair and logical result: Shell caused the 
injury, Shell’s insurance pays, Shell’s insurance premium goes up, and now 
Shell has incentive in the future to prevent such accidents.  The subcontractor’s 
insurance pays nothing, which is only reasonable as the subcontractor did 
nothing wrong. 
B. The Parties 
A simple solution to the additional insured situation seems to lie with the 
subcontractors simply assuming greater insurance costs in their bids to the 
general contractors.  However, even if the subcontractor begins to assume 
greater insurance costs in formulating his bids as his premium increases, the 
 
 247. Cubbage, supra note 25, at 3. 
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 251. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enter., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).  For a 
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general contractor is going to pass the subcontractor’s cost to the property 
owner with a mark-up.253  If the general contractor can keep his own insurance 
costs down by insisting on additional insured status and passing his risk 
downstream, he will not care if the subcontractor has more cost because he 
simply passes the cost up to the owner.254  Consequently, this issue is going to 
resolve itself through negotiation only when enough subcontractors realize the 
sizeable risk they are assuming and start to say, “NO.”255 
In lieu of offering the general contactor additional insured status, a 
promising alternative is to offer him an Owner-Contractor Protective (OCP) 
policy.256  This policy has advantages for both the subcontractor and the 
general contractor.257  From the general contractor’s perspective, it is 
beneficial because he is not sharing the limits of the subcontractor’s policy 
with the subcontractor and every other additional insured, rather he is covered 
by a project-specific policy with separate limits.258  The subcontractor who 
purchases the insurance receives no coverage under this policy (he is still 
covered by his own general liability policy), so the general contractor has more 
coverage for himself.259  Additionally, the general contractor is a directly 
insured party, so the OCP carrier owes a duty to defend any claims 
immediately and to satisfy any imposed liabilities that fall within the scope of 
coverage.260 
From the subcontractor’s perspective, OCP is beneficial because it does 
not consume his own policy limits, and the loss experience is counted 
separately from his own liability policy’s loss experience (i.e., his own policy 
premium will not increase or be cancelled).261  Also, the negligence of the 
insureds is excluded from coverage because the policy is limited to claims for 
the named insured’s vicarious liability or claims based on supervisory 
functions of the general contractor.262 
Providing this OCP policy will force a subcontractor, before submitting a 
bid to the general contractor, to price separately and to contemplate both the 
risk it is agreeing to insure and what multiple of that risk should be included in 
his bid to the general contractor.263  This system, which holds each individual 
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insured financially responsible for his own behavior, would bring a reasonable 
pricing model to the market for construction insurance and strengthen 
incentives for construction participants to keep prices down by safeguarding 
both workers and consumers.264 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
The courts’ broad interpretation of additional insured endorsements are 
conferring too much coverage on general contractors.  The initial intent of 
these endorsements was to give immediate and direct coverage to general 
contractors in situations where the general contractor was held vicariously 
liable for acts of his subcontractor.  The low price charged for these 
endorsements confirms this intent.  However, courts have now begun to read 
broadly these endorsements and confer coverage not only for vicarious 
liability, but for the sole negligence of the general contractor as well.  Courts 
do not understand the unique status additional insureds hold and are therefore 
interpreting these endorsements in the same manner they would in a dispute 
over coverage for the named insured.  These expansive readings have a 
detrimental effect on subcontractors whose insurance is called on to defend.  
However, the courts do not see this because the parties in front of them are not 
normally the subcontractors, but two insurance companies litigating over who 
should bear the financial liability.  The subcontractor’s deductible is many 
times maxed out, his premiums may go up, and his policy may be cancelled.  
Additionally, no public policy argument can justify this broad interpretation.  
The general contractor often has his own liability insurance coverage to pay 
out any judgments, settlements, or defense costs he incurs.  He is also, as an 
additional insured, not entering into a contract of adhesion, thereby negating 
the argument that any ambiguous terms should be interpreted in his favor.  
Lastly, pushing this burden of covering the general contractor for the general 
contractor’s sole negligence is making the subcontractor, who has no control 
over the risk, responsible for suffering the financial loss.  It is the 
subcontractor, the least able to pay for the cost of this risk, who is left paying 
for the negligent acts of others.  Additional insured endorsements should be 
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